Emotional prosperity and the Stiglitz Commission by Oswald, Andrew J.
 
 
 
 
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap 
 
This paper is made available online in accordance with 
publisher policies. Please scroll down to view the document 
itself. Please refer to the repository record for this item and our 
policy information available from the repository home page for 
further information.  
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription. 
 
Author(s):  Oswald, Andrew J. 
 
Article Title: Emotional Prosperity and the Stiglitz Commission 
 
Year of publication:  2010 
 
Link to published article:  
 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/
2010/twerp_950.pdf 
 
Publisher statement: None  
 
  
Emotional Prosperity and the Stiglitz Commission 
 
Andrew J. Oswald 
 
No 950 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WARWICK ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
 
 Forthcoming in the British Journal of Industrial Relations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emotional Prosperity and the Stiglitz Commission 
 
 
 
 
Andrew J. Oswald 
andrew.oswald@warwick.ac.uk 
 
2010 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper argues -- in line with the proposals of the recent Stiglitz Commission 
on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress -- that we 
should now be measuring a nation‟s emotional prosperity rather than its 
economic prosperity (that is, we ought to focus on the level of mental well-being 
not the number of pounds in people‟s bank accounts).  The paper reviews 
recent ideas in this field.  It also describes seven recent studies that, worryingly, 
suggest that emotional prosperity may be declining through time.  For labour-
market specialists, a key question for future research is how much this 
downward trend can be traced back to increased pressures in working life.  
That question currently remains open. 
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 Emotional Prosperity and the Stiglitz Commission 
Andrew J. Oswald 
 
A ... key message, and unifying theme of the report, is that the time is ripe for our measurement 
system to shift emphasis from measuring economic production to measuring people’s well-being.  
p.6  Executive Summary: Stiglitz Commission Report 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper, which I hope might be of interest to a range of social scientists, is 
concerned with what could be called the emotional prosperity of a society.  The 
paper will use that -- admittedly unusual -- term for two reasons.  First, the term 
makes clear an intentional contrast with economic prosperity and Gross Domestic 
Product.  Second, it seems sufficiently general that it allows various measures of 
well-being (happiness, life satisfaction, mental health) to be considered under a 
single, broad heading.  The aim of this essay is to communicate some of the 
empirical results that have emerged recently in a new literature that spans journals 
from economics to medicine.  It is thus a review essay rather than an attempt to 
document new findings.  For social and behavioural scientists as a group, the 
essay‟s principal argument is that mental well-being can be measured reasonably 
persuasively and that there is evidence that its level is declining.  For industrial 
relations researchers more specifically, there is evidence in this literature that work 
matters in a particularly influential way to people‟s emotional prosperity (a fine paper 
showing that is Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998), and there remains an open 
important question about whether the apparent decline in well-being can be traced 
back to factors in the modern workplace (Green 2006 is one of the fullest studies of 
that issue).  Labour-market specialists may also be interested in the fact that so-
called compensating differential theory, due originally to Adam Smith‟s idea that 
different jobs would offer different mixtures of good and bad features, has been used 
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recently to help to validate subjective well-being data (in US data in Oswald and Wu 
2010).     
Social-science researchers, including industrial relations researchers, 
economists, and psychologists, are likely to be sympathetic to some version of the 
idea that human well-being matters in itself – perhaps as a, or even the, goal of a 
society.  A large research literature on the topic is springing up (including, in the last 
decade alone, Frey and Stutzer 2002; Easterlin 2003; Kahneman et al 2004; Van 
Praag and Ferrer-I-Carbonell 2004; Graham 2005; Bray and Gunnell 2006; Clark et 
al 2008; Diener et al 2008; Stevenson and Wolfers 2008).  Human well-being also 
matters indirectly: it moulds other important phenomena and actions.  Recent 
research on the physiology of the body and the immune system, for example, 
suggests that happiness and mental health appear to be protective: psychological 
health is associated with faster physical healing in laboratory tests in which people 
are given standardized punch biopsies (Ebrecht et al 2004) and also with reduced 
levels of cortisol and inflammatory markers (Steptoe et al 2005; Steptoe et al 2007).  
Happier people resist the common cold more effectively than others when exposed 
to nasal drops that contain a rhinovirus (Cohen et al 2003); they also seem, later in 
life, to suffer lower rates of hypertension (Jonas and Lando 2000); and happier 
nations have less hypertension (Blanchflower and Oswald 2008). 
 The paper also considers, and is partly motivated by, the recent Stiglitz 
Commission‟s report on the measurement of economic and social progress in a 
modern economy.  This report, which may not yet be known to all social scientists, 
was published in 2009 and can be downloaded from www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr.  The 
Commission was set up by Nicholas Sarkozy of France.  An abbreviated list of the 
recommendations from the Stiglitz Commission is given in the Appendix.   
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The novel aspect of the report by the Stiglitz group is its emphasis on the 
need for measures of emotional prosperity (though it did not use that exact term) 
rather than merely the traditional ones, such as Gross Domestic Product, of 
pecuniary prosperity: 
 “Measures of .. objective and subjective well-being provide key information about 
people’s quality of life.” p.16. Executive Summary of Commission Report. 
The following arguments are particularly important parts of the Report (pp. 10-16) 
and convey its message: 
 Life is now more complex (“The time has come to adapt our system of 
measurement … to better reflect the structural changes which have 
characterized the evolution of modern economies.”)  
 Services, rather than manufacturing, now dominate the world of work. (“In 
effect, the growing share of services and the production of increasingly 
complex products make the measurement of output and economic 
performance more difficult than in the past.”) 
 We, as a society, need to measure well-being per se. (“A… unifying theme of 
the report, is that the time is ripe for our measurement system to shift 
emphasis from measuring economic production to measuring people’s well-
being.”) 
 Inequality itself matters (“Quality-of-life indicators in all the dimensions 
covered should assess inequalities in a comprehensive way.”) 
 Official government statistics should blend objective and subjective well-being 
data. (“Statistical offices should incorporate questions to capture people’s life 
evaluations, hedonic experiences and priorities in their own survey.”) 
 4 
 Sustainability must be a criterion (“Sustainability assessment requires a well-
identified dashboard of indicators…the components of this dashboard should be 
… interpretable as variations of some underlying “stocks”. A monetary index of 
sustainability has its place in such a dashboard.”) 
2. Well-being and its Measurement 
The background to the Stiglitz Report seems clear.  In the typical developed 
country, material prosperity is now remarkably high by the standards of history.  No-
one goes hungry; the chance of death in child-birth is low; almost everyone receives 
an education; there is little chance of the secret police coming in the night to take a 
person away; hot showers and fast cars are commonplace; if sickness strikes, there 
is medical care.  Hence, by the standards of almost all countries, and almost all of 
human history, such nations are financially blessed.   
Nevertheless, as Offer (2007) and others have argued, there are reasons to 
think that not all is well.   Some citizens display signs of mental turmoil amid the 
financial security of modern living (McManus et al 2009 conclude that at any one 
time approximately 15% of people in the UK suffer from at least one mental disorder: 
their p.11) and Richard Easterlin‟s seminal doubts (Easterlin 1974, 2003) remain.  
Most modern analysts in this research field believe that the Easterlin Paradox -- the 
lack of an association between growth in Gross Domestic Product and any trend in 
reported happiness -- persists stubbornly in the data.   
Although it is harder than to count up pound notes, we therefore seem to need 
somehow to be able to assess emotional prosperity.  The present paper is 
concerned with that for rich countries (I shall here ignore developing nations, where, 
in my personal view, economic growth is still needed) and is partly about the 
economics of happiness.  Some will think that the words „economics‟ and „happiness‟ 
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do not deserve to go together in a sentence, but much research is starting to link 
those two notions.  The field of quantitative social science has changed noticeably in 
the last 20 years and there is a sense in which social scientists are drawing closer to 
subjects like medicine.  Economists, in particular, have begun to publish in 
epidemiology journals, in science journals, and more broadly.  Some observers will 
see this as a good step for the economics profession, although it seems inevitable 
that the borders between economics (officially defined) and other social science 
disciplines are going to become increasingly blurred.  
To do this kind of work, researchers take random samples of people from 
nations across the world and are interested in understanding what it is that explains -
- in a statistical sense -- the patterns of happiness or mental health across different 
sorts of people and, second, what explains the levels of happiness and mental health 
across different nations.  Some researchers believe it may eventually be possible to 
learn how to make whole countries happier.  In this area of intellectual inquiry, two 
questions are central.  One is: should our goal for the rest of this century be, as it 
more or less has for the past 50 years, to try to maximise GDP?   Should we have 
that aim, of four BMWs for everybody, by the end of the century?  The spirit of the 
Stiglitz Commission report is that such a path would be the wrong one, and that 
emotions not pound notes should be measured.  Second, at the micro level, what 
shapes human well-being?  This is the subject matter of an empirical literature in 
which many different sorts of researchers estimate multiple regression equations 
with well-being as a dependent variable. 
To assess „emotional prosperity‟, it is presumably necessary to have a 
yardstick that is as psychological as it is economic.  The most-used approach has 
been to ask survey questions about how content people are with their lives.  In 
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western countries, most individuals say they are rather satisfied and happy with life.  
As an example, Figure 1 gives well-being answers for Britain.  Here the data are 
from a question “How satisfied are you with your life overall?” in which interviewees 
were asked to give an answer on a scale from 7 (I am completely satisfied with my 
life) down to 1 (completely dissatisfied).  Figure 1 reveals the skewness typically 
found in well-being data.  It should perhaps be emphasized that researchers are not 
dominantly interested in the exact words that interviewees use.  Instead, they are 
interested in the ordering of answers across categories and why some sorts of 
people mark themselves high and others low.    
Life is a mixture of ups and downs and it is therefore unsurprising that in the 
data a person‟s happiness score is strongly correlated -- in sensible ways -- with the 
good and bad things that happen in life.  Work is central to emotional prosperity.  
Perhaps of particular interest to industrial relations researchers and labour 
economists is the finding from happiness research that unemployment has a huge, 
negative impact on people‟s well-being and that the size of this effect goes far 
beyond that of the drop in take-home income.   Researchers such as Winkelmann 
and Winkelmann (1998) demonstrate this in German panel data: they show that 
approximately 80% of people‟s measured decline in mental well-being after being 
made unemployed stems from non-pecuniary rather than pecuniary sources.  
Similarly, before couples divorce, we see in longitudinal data a low level of well-
being, and then eventually a rise in their levels of happiness; before a first-baby is 
born, there is a surge in reported well-being, but after that a marked drop to below 
the earlier levels.  It is now known that there is also a striking life-cycle pattern.  A 
typical person, in a developed economy, will slide down a giant U shape of 
happiness though life.  Figure 2, which is due to the economist Nick Powdthavee, is 
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based on a random sample for Britain.  The general U-shape has appeared in the 
published literature since at least Clark and Oswald (1994) and in the last decade 
has been replicated by large numbers of research teams.  The numbers in a figure 
like Figure 2 are statistical averages traced out from survey data and the U-shape is 
only an approximation.  A few years before people die, there is some evidence that 
reported happiness begins to drop down again (not shown in the figure); presumably 
that is because of the incapacity that occurs, fairly commonly, at the end of life.  
Following researchers such as Richard Easterlin and Edward Diener, the 
earliest approach to the formal measurement of human happiness and wellbeing, 
was to take a survey such as the General Social Survey of the USA which asks 
individuals, randomly sampled, “taken altogether how would you say that things are 
these days?” Do you think of yourself as very happy, pretty happy or not too happy?”  
It was quickly found that approximately one third of Americans will tick the box 
saying they feel very happy with their life, and around 10 percent to 20 percent will 
tick the “I‟m not too happy with my life” box.   
Another potential measure of emotional prosperity is a GHQ score.  It is an 
indicator of psychological distress and mental strain (explained at length, for 
example, in Goldberg et al 1997); the now-famous GHQ acronym comes from 
“general health questionnaire”.  This measure originally was used by epidemiologists 
and doctors; it is a summary statistic that aggregates people‟s answers to a 
particular string of queries.  In one version of this measure, individuals answer 12 
separate mental-distress questions: “Have you lost much sleep over worry?”; “Been 
able to concentrate on things?”; “Felt you are playing a useful part in things?”; “Felt 
capable of making decisions about things?”; “Felt constantly under strain?”; “Felt you 
could not overcome your difficulties?”;  “Been able to enjoy your normal day-to-day 
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activities”; “Been able to face up to your problems”; “Been feeling unhappy and 
depressed?”; “Been losing confidence in yourself?”; “Been thinking of yourself as a 
worthless person?”; “Been feeling reasonably happy all things considered?”.  People 
in the surveys are asked to answer on a scale from „much more than usual‟ down to 
„much less than usual‟.  More recently, Hu et al (2007) and other researchers have 
suggested that GHQ scores can be used to measure positive mental well-being and 
not merely identify signs of clinical mental-health problems (although Huppert and 
Whittington 2003 argue that there are necessarily separate components to positive 
and negative well-being).   
Well-being researchers take information on life-satisfaction numbers and 
GHQ scores and then estimate regression equations -- in everyday language, the 
researchers take large numbers of data points and estimate best-fitting lines -- and in 
that way they try to uncover the relationships between income and education, 
gender, having children, and reporting whether or not people are happy with your life 
and have good mental health.  Given the evident complexity of a concept such as 
human well-being, it is natural to be concerned with the issue of whether this can be 
done in a believable, systematic manner.  Debates about that continue.  One thing 
we know is that if researchers look at slices through human brains while people are 
in an MRI scanner, emotions such as happiness and sadness do show up in distinct 
ways in different parts of the brain (Urry et al 2004), so there at a physiological level 
we know something about what looks like high happiness relative to low happiness.  
We know also that well-being scores are correlated with blood pressure and heart-
beat (Steptoe et al 2005).  On happiness and hypertension, it has recently been 
shown in Blanchflower and Oswald (2008) that a statistical relationship exists in 
which countries where people actually say they are happy are also nations in which 
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there is less reported hypertension (high blood pressure).  Hence these subjective 
responses of people in surveys are correlated with objective well-being criteria.  
There is increasing interest in the idea that some mixture of biomarkers and 
subjective well-being data might help us to measure human well-being.  This links 
social-science to an epidemiological and physiological literature represented by work 
such as Crimmins et al (2008), Edmunds (1982), Powdthavee (2009), Seeman et al 
(2009), Singh and Rose (2009), and Troubat et al (2009).  The last is suggestive of 
the idea that the human fight-or-flight response may allow mental stress to be 
measured in an objective way. 
 However, a straightforwardly relevant question to ask is whether subjective 
responses on people‟s feelings of psychological well-being are reliable.  Krueger and 
Schkade (2008), who argue in the affirmative, show that people‟s own satisfaction 
answers through time are correlated with a Pearson‟s r of approximately 0.6.  To 
probe this issue further, a sharp test would be needed where humans‟ subjective 
assessments can be compared to objective ones.  By its nature, that is likely to be 
difficult for variables such as happiness and mental health.   
A recent attempt to address the broad issue -- that of whether objective and 
subjective data match up -- in another kind of setting is described in the study of 
Oswald (2008), which collected data on human height.   Height may seem a strange 
variable to study, but it has the scientific advantage that it is verifiable in a way that is 
not open to dispute.  In that study, the simple question asked of individuals was, in a 
similar kind of spirit to happiness-questionnaire inquiries, 
How tall do you feel you are relative to your gender (put a cross on the line)? Very 
short .... Very tall. 
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People answered this question, about how tall they felt, by marking a point anywhere 
they wished along a horizontal line that was written out for them on a sheet of paper.  
The line had a low end marked Very Short and a high end of Very Tall.  There were 
ten small vertical dashes spaced along the line, to help respondents visually, but 
subjects were not obliged to make a mark literally on one of those.  Although no 
integers were used on the subjects‟ answer sheets, for the analysis their answers 
were coded from a low of 0 to a maximum of 10.  By measuring the marks made by 
subjects, an exact position (to one decimal point) could be assigned to their position 
along the unit interval. 
Objective data were then recorded in centimetres.  After they gave their 
subjective scores, people were measured for actual height (it should be explained 
that when answering the first question about their subjective feeling about their 
height, they could probably tell, from the way the study was set up, that they were 
likely actually to be measured).  The male mean height was 179.5 centimetres and 
for women 165.0 centimetres.  These data were collected in a public setting at 
Warwick University.  As an incentive, small rewards were given to those taking part.  
The sample size was 219, which was approximately equally divided between men 
(113) and women (106).  The subjects were university students. 
As can be seen in Figure 3, using data drawn from Oswald (2008), a strong 
correlation exists between subjective and objective height.  When separated into two 
sub-samples, by gender, it was not possible to reject the null hypothesis of linearity 
in the reporting function.  In Figure 3, measures of objective and subjective tallness 
are correlated with a Pearson‟s r = 0.8. 
 The point of this is straightforward: it is to illustrate that people‟s subjective 
feelings can be an accurate guide to reality.  Some social scientists (especially 
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certain kinds of applied psychologists) will not find that surprising; but there is a long 
tradition in a subject such as economics that, because of their likely inaccuracy, all 
subjective measures should be resisted. 
Further evidence of a match between subjective and objective, and thus of the 
potential validity of well-being data, comes from Oswald and Wu (2010).  An 
illustration of this kind of result is given in Figure 4.  Their study builds indirectly on 
labour-market theory, and the idea of a spatial equilibrium in which people move to 
nice places to live, as represented in a source such as Gabriel et al (2003).  The 
Oswald-Wu study reveals, with the help of data from the Behavioural Factor 
Response Survey System, which is organized by the Centres for Disease Control of 
the United States, that there is a marked correlation across the states of the USA 
between people‟s life satisfaction answers and the implied quality-of-life estimate 
(based only on objective data on things like sunshine hours and levels of congestion) 
from a compensating-differentials theory from neoclassical economics.  This seems 
to be valuable information because it makes it hard for sceptics of subjective well-
being questions to claim that the numbers do not measure anything reliable. 
For an environmentalist, or an environmental economist, the new methods of 
„happiness economics‟ are potentially valuable, because in the last few years it has 
become feasible, using statistical techniques, to put dollar, euro, pound values on 
the happiness from clean air, lack of noise, lack of chemical additives, and so on.  A 
well-designed example is that of the work by Luechinger (2009) on sulphur monoxide 
emissions, who is able to value the well-being produced by clean air.  Although many 
economists are not yet aware of such research (and perhaps even fewer 
environmentalists are), this could turn out to be a large research area.  The 
technique of estimating happiness equations, reading off the coefficients, deriving 
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backwards the implied monetary values, and thus the happiness coming from certain 
things, potentially offers an objective way to calculate the values of different „green‟ 
variables.   
Researchers have also examined the happiness of nations.  It has been 
known for a long time, and has recently been pointed out in a comprehensive way by 
Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), that if we look at a scatter plot across countries, with 
GDP per capita on the x axis and standardised life satisfaction on the y axis, there is 
a positive association.  On average, mental wellbeing is greater the greater is that 
nation‟s real GDP; so there is a simple cross-section connection between a country 
being richer and feeling happier.  As noted in the Stiglitz Report, however, the 
potential problem for economic policy in western society is Richard Easterlin‟s 
famous Paradox -- that if you take random sample surveys (e.g. from the United 
States) where you ask people “how happy are you with your life?” the happiness 
answers run flat through the years.   
This Easterlin result is either false or is of fundamental importance to 
policymakers and politicians; in principle, his result undermines the raison d‟etre of 
GDP growth.  The paradox is intellectually, and arguably even personally and 
emotionally, a threat to the philosophy and speeches of policymakers, bankers, 
politicians.  It is against the spirit of much that has been taught to economics 
students – that more economic growth and the sheer possession of extra things 
should lead society to greater happiness.  
3. What is Happening to Emotional Prosperity through Time?   
If we turn to broader measures of psychological well-being, there is some 
reason to be even more pessimistic than Easterlin, and to believe that emotional 
prosperity is declining through time.  The following section illustrates that and 
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provides thumbnail summaries, drawing sometimes on the authors‟ own statements 
of why their work is interesting, of seven studies: 
Sweeting et al (2009) 
In this important examination of young people, data were drawn from three 
longitudinal samples identical in respect of their age (15 years), school year (final 
year of statutory schooling) and geographical location (the West of Scotland).  Each 
group filled in the 12-item General Health Questionnaire in 1987 (sample size N = 
505), 1999 (N = 2,196) and 2006 (N = 3,194). The authors then examine changes in: 
GHQ „caseness‟ (which, loosely, is a measure of high mental strain); individual 
items; and factors, derived via confirmatory factor analysis representing (a) „negative‟ 
and „positive‟ items, and (b) „anxiety and depression‟, „loss of confidence or self-
esteem‟ and „anhedonia and social dysfunction‟. The authors find that GHQ levels 
worsen considerably through the studied period.  Measuring mental distress with the 
standard (2/3) cut-off definition, „caseness‟ rates in 1987, 1999 and 2006 were 12.7, 
15.1 and 21.5% (males) and 18.8, 32.5 and 44.1% (females). Similar increases were 
observed with other, more stringent „caseness‟ cut-offs. Examination of individual 
items showed some to have increased much more markedly over time than others. 
There were larger increases in mental distress among females for all except two 
items and some evidence, among both genders, of slightly steeper increases among 
„negative‟ items compared with „positive‟ ones. Although the authors accept that 
larger increases in „negative‟ items raise the possibility that endorsing such 
symptoms may have become more acceptable, they dismiss any extreme concerns 
here.  They argue that the worsening on all dimensions of psychological distress 
suggests that their measured outcome is likely to be a genuine one (rather than the 
result of how people used language differently by 2006). 
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Sacker and Wiggins (2002) 
This study exploits data from two unusually powerful data sets.  These are the 1958 
National Child Development Study (effective sample size approximately 12000) and 
the 1970 British Cohort Study (effective sample size approximately 13000) collected 
when the cohort members were aged between 23 and 42. Multilevel logistic 
regression models were used to examine the effects of social class, gender, age, 
period and cohort on psychological distress as measured by a so-called Malaise 
Inventory, developed from the Cornell Medical Index Questionnaire from which 14 of 
the items are derived. This self-completion questionnaire was administered at the 
end of the interview or postal questionnaire. It includes statements relating to the 
symptoms of anxiety, depression and associated psychosomatic distress with which 
the respondent either agrees or disagrees. As the authors explain, their total 
symptom score is derived from a count of the number of items that elicit a positive 
response. The authors do manage to identify social inequalities in psychological 
distress during 1981-2000 and to demonstrate that these reduced in magnitude over 
this period (consistent with the idea that things became worse more sharply for those 
who were initially doing well psychologically).  Non-linear age effects were observed: 
psychological distress declined on approaching mid-life.  The 1970 cohort had 
poorer psychological distress than the 1958 cohort.  Over this run of years, therefore, 
the authors discover that on their calculations the risk of psychological distress 
among Britain‟s citizens approximately doubled (p. 984 of Sacker and Wiggins).  
Hodiamont et al (2005) 
These authors took repeated cross-sectional data; their underlying survey 
information is on citizens in a region of the Netherlands. The authors calculated the 
prevalence of psychiatric disorders in the general population of this area for two 
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separate years, namely, 1983 and 1997.  With this usefully wide interval of 14 years, 
2 two-phase studies of psychiatric prevalence were carried out among the 
inhabitants of the Dutch Health Area of Nijmegen. In phase 1, a random sample of 
persons answered the General Health Questionnaire (in this case, it was the so-
called GHQ-30). After that, in phase 2, the respondents were interviewed using a 
clinical semi-structured interview. Both samples were of approximately 4500 people.  
Only phase 1 data are reported in the authors‟ study.  The authors‟ key finding is that 
the mean GHQ-score worsened significantly from 3.1 (+/-1.0) in 1983 to 4.6 (+/-1.8) 
in 1997.  The authors show that psychiatric prevalence increased in all socio-
demographic categories.  They conclude that „despite the improved socioeconomic 
conditions in the survey population as a whole... the increasing complexity of life 
apparently takes its toll, even of the socially best-equipped‟.  Although this Dutch 
study is careful to point out that it could not ensure absolutely identical designs in 
1983 and 1997, the paper seems an important contribution. 
Wauterickx and Bracke (2005) 
This research paper built upon data from 1992 to 1999 from the panel study of 
Belgian Households (PSBH), which is a longitudinal database with yearly surveys 
that includes 3,546 longitudinal respondents (1,612 men and 1,933 women).  The 
authors use a formal measure of depression.  That is assessed with a modified 
version of the Health and Daily Living Form (HDL) that contains 13 depression items.  
With latent variable growth-curve modelling, and their statistically representative 
sample of the Belgian population, the authors conclude that -- regardless of age, 
sex, educational attainment, work loss or divorce -- there is evidence of an 
underlying upward trend in rates of depression.  There is a slightly larger growth rate 
in depression for the female respondents.  The authors argue that the way that 
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depression is measured captures gender differences adequately and that the scale 
itself is significantly reproducible over the 8-year period.  
Verhaak et al (2005) 
Using two comparable morbidity studies carried out in the Netherlands and in 
primary care, this study compares Dutch mental well-being between 1987 and 2001.  
Their first sample is approximately 9000 in size; the second sample is approximately 
10,000 citizens.  The authors‟ aim is to assess the following: possible differences in 
mental health between 1987 and 2001; possible differences in prevalence of mental 
disorder as diagnosed by GPs in those years; possible differences in the socio-
demographic determinants of mental health and mental disorder in primary care 
through time.   The results uncover an increase in mental and social problems in the 
population between 1987 and 2001.  However, GPs diagnosed fewer patients as 
having a mental disorder in 2001 than they did in 1987. The risk of mental disorders 
or social problems in several socio-demographic groups remained largely the same, 
as did the chance of receiving a psychological or social diagnosis.  The researchers 
conclude that, while mental disorder in the Dutch population is increasing, the role of 
primary care has changed. Although GPs diagnose a lower percentage of mental 
problems as such, they refer an increasingly larger proportion of these to secondary 
care. 
Green and Tsitsianis (2005) 
This paper is of a slightly different, but complementary, kind, and makes the labour 
market central to thinking about the topic.  It measured the levels of job satisfaction 
over time in Britain and Germany.  Contrary to what might be expected from popular 
commentary, changing job insecurity does not explain the fall in job satisfaction in 
either country. It is found, in data from BHPS and GSOEP, that job satisfaction has 
 17 
declined through time.  In Britain, from 1972 to 1983, it fell slightly according to 
General Household Survey data, although the downward trend is at the margin of 
statistical significance; then from 1992 to 2002 the rate of decline is quicker, and 
statistically significant.  The authors show a similar trend for Germany between 1984 
and 2002.  They then examine data on the intensification of work effort and declining 
task discretion, and conclude that these can account statistically for the fall in job 
satisfaction in Britain. In Germany, the changes were in the same broad direction as 
for Britain, but were too small to account for the fall in job satisfaction. 
Oswald and Powdthavee (2007) 
One further research study to find evidence of worsening emotional prosperity is that 
of Oswald and Powdthavee (2007).  The authors examine British BHPS data from 
the early 1990s. GHQ psychological distress scores rose from 1991 to 2004.  The 
increase is statistically significant at normal confidence levels.  In a regression 
equation, pooling the years 1991-2004, the authors find that, where the mean of 
GHQ is approximately 11.2 (with SD 5.4.):  
GHQ = 0.01 time trend + constant + controls for age, gender, marital status,    
employment status, education level. 
The coefficient on the time trend has a t-statistic of approximately 2.3.  Hence 
psychological health in Great Britain is apparently gradually worsening, ceteris 
paribus, by approximately 0.1 GHQ point per decade. 
 One final piece of evidence, although not published in an academic journal, 
comes from the UK National Health Service‟s recent report Adult Psychiatric 
Morbidity in England in 2007: Results of a Household Survey.  It compares randomly 
selected samples for the years 1993, 2000, and 2007.  In technical language, the 
report concludes, among other findings, that (page 29 of the report, where the 
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acronym CIS stands for Clinical Interview Schedule): Overall, the proportion of people aged 
16-64 with a CIS-R score of 12 or more increased between 1993 and 2000, but did not increase again 
between 2000 and 2007 (14.1% in 1993, 16.3% in 2000, 16.4% in 2007). 
Here, a CIS-R score is a measure of neurotic symptoms and common psychiatric 
disorders, so that the survey evidence is consistent, once again, with the idea that 
mental well-being may be worsening secularly through the decades.  The interesting 
issue of whether the marginal rise of 0.1% between 2000 and 2007 marks a plateau 
will only be answered when the next sweep of this survey is done. 
 Taken together, these studies seem to paint a similar picture.  Unfortunately, it 
is not one that most citizens or politicians would find reassuring.  It is sensible, as 
ever, to view all these empirical studies as ones that need further verification; this is 
an intellectual area where the issues are inherently difficult and subtle ones; further 
work, especially on longitudinal measures of mental well-being for other countries, 
needs to be undertaken.  Nevertheless, the papers‟ statistical results do appear to be 
consistent with the idea that well-being, measured broadly in human terms (namely, 
in terms of emotional prosperity), rather than in the pound notes of GDP, is if 
anything diminishing through time.  Even with the appropriate caveats, and they are 
plentiful, that is troubling. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper has argued that we should measure, and focus attention upon, 
emotional prosperity.  The time-series facts described in the paper -- looking 
particularly at the seven studies listed earlier -- seem sufficiently worrying to justify 
further research and to throw a confirming light on the concerns of the Stiglitz 
Commission.   
What is it that goes wrong in a country as it gets richer?  Although we do not 
yet know, one possibility is, as Green‟s (2006) research suggests, that modern work 
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itself may put extreme pressure on people.  The Stiglitz report also emphasized the 
changed nature of today‟s work tasks.  Nevertheless, more empirical research will be 
needed before we can be certain of the role of modern workplaces in the apparent 
drop in emotional prosperity.  A second possibility is that humans are animals of 
comparison (some of the latest evidence of the importance of relativities, from brain 
scans, is reported in Fliessbach et al 2007).  What I want, if only subconsciously, 
may be to have three BMWs and for my friends to have old Fords.  In well-off 
countries, the tide of economic growth lifts all boats and, unfortunately, where having 
two BMWs was unusual, eventually it becomes the norm and thus there is potentially 
a kind of generalised neutrality -- a sort of washing-out effect of the supposed 
benefits of economic progress.  Easterlin (1974) made this form of argument and it is 
continued today in sources such as Clark et al (2008) and Layard (2010).  A third 
possible reason is that people may make bad choices and do things that, despite 
what they think, will not make them happier.  Economists have resisted this idea 
(about so-called affective forecasting mistakes) for a long time; the economics 
profession has so far not listened to psychologists like Daniel Gilbert (2006); that 
may prove to be a significant mistake.   
This paper‟s evidence in Section 3 could be viewed as complementary to that 
compiled earlier, on the levels of happiness and life satisfaction, by Richard 
Easterlin.  Although Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) doubt the veracity of it, the 
weight of the published work in economics journals is currently in line with Easterlin‟s 
paradox.  The Stevenson and Wolfers critique remains an interesting one and a 
valuable intellectual contribution that makes further research on the topic essential.  
However, it is open to the objection that much of the authors‟ evidence is cross-
sectional, that their key long-difference estimates in their Table 4 do not attain 
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conventional levels of statistical significance, and that their regression equations do 
not allow for the effects of the unemployment rate upon nations‟ happiness and life 
satisfaction (those are known to be important, and are correlated in the short-run 
with GDP movements, so the omission of an unemployment variable in country-
panel estimation of well-being equations may lead to upward bias on a GDP 
variable).  They also stand outnumbered.  Once again, more research would be 
desirable.  
As undergraduates, many people were taught that the appropriate definition of 
economics -- one generally attributed to Lionel Robbins of the London School of 
Economics -- is that of a social science concerned with the efficient allocation of 
scarce resources.  At the time of writing, I believe it would be valuable, at least in the 
rich nations of the modern world, to alter that definition: economics should perhaps 
now be viewed as a social science concerned with the way to allocate plentiful 
resources to maximize a society‟s mental well-being.  That is a more complex task 
that Lionel Robbins had in mind.  It seems reasonable to expect that in the future it 
will take teams with mixtures of researchers (psychologists, medical statisticians, 
industrial relations researchers, economists, physicians, sociologists, and others) to 
get us to a real understanding of emotional prosperity. 
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Appendix 
The Stiglitz Report’s Formal Recommendations (an abbreviated form of the list in the 
Executive Summary of the Report) 
 
#1: When evaluating material well-being, look at income and consumption rather than 
production. 
 
#2: Emphasise the household perspective. 
 
#3: Consider income and consumption jointly with wealth. 
 
#4: Give more prominence to the distribution of income, consumption and wealth. 
 
#5: Broaden income measures to non-market activities 
 
#6: Quality of life depends on people‟s objective conditions and capabilities. Substantial 
effort should be devoted to developing and implementing robust, reliable measures of social 
connections, political voice, and insecurity that can be shown to predict life satisfaction. 
 
#7: Quality-of-life indicators in all the dimensions covered should assess inequalities in a 
comprehensive way 
 
#8: Surveys should be designed to assess the links between various quality-of-life domains 
for each person, and this information should be used when designing policies in various 
fields 
 
#9: Statistical offices should provide the information needed to aggregate across quality-of-
life dimensions, allowing the construction of different indexes. 
 
#10: Measures of both objective and subjective well-being provide key information about 
people‟s quality of life. Statistical offices should incorporate questions to capture people‟s life 
evaluations, hedonic experiences and priorities in their own survey. 
 
#11: Sustainability assessment requires a well-identified dashboard of indicators. The 
distinctive feature of the components of this dashboard should be that they are interpretable 
as variations of some underlying “stocks”.  
 
#12: There is need for a clear indicator of our proximity to dangerous levels of environmental 
damage (such as associated with climate change or the depletion of fishing stocks.) 
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Figure 1: The Distribution of Life-Satisfaction in Britain (BHPS data – sample size 
approx 75,000 observations) where 7 is Completely Satisfied. 1991-2002 data. 
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Figure 2: Well-being Through the Lifespan in British Data (BHPS data, 1991-2002) 
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Source: N. Powdthavee, Department of Economics, University of York.
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Figure 3: 
 
An Example of Close Correlation between Subjective Feelings  
and Objective Data: Heights in a Sample of 113 Males 
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Note: By marking a point on an interval, respondents were asked to record how tall they felt, using a 
continuous un-numbered line with the words „very short‟ written at the left-hand end to „very tall‟ at the 
right-hand end. The numbering zero to ten was used afterwards to code their marked answers along 
the interval. 
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Figure 4: A Demonstration of the Match Between Subjective and Objective 
Well-being across the States of the USA 
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Fitted Equation: Adjusted Life Satisfaction = -0.0035 – 0.0012 Objective Rank      R=0.598 
 
This uses data taken from Oswald and Wu (2010).  The x axis relies on a compensating-differentials 
theory of labour market equilibrium.  Each dot is a state.  The correlation is significant at p<0.001 on a 
two-tailed test.  This figure plots state dummy coefficients from a life-satisfaction equation against 
state rank in quality-of-life from the compensating-differential results, using only objective data, of 
Gabriel et al (2003).  Life satisfaction is coded for each individual from a score of 4 (very satisfied) to 1 
(very dissatisfied).  On the y-axis, the regression controls for household income as well as the survey 
respondent‟s gender, age, age squared, education, marital status, unemployment, and race, and also 
year dummies and month-of-interview dummies.  Alabama is included.  Washington DC is omitted 
from Gabriel et al (2003) and thus here.  The bottom right hand observation is New York.  Question 
wording in the BRFSS questionnaire is: 
 
In general, how satisfied are you with your life?  
(BRFSS Questionnaire Line 206)  
1 Very satisfied  
2 Satisfied  
3 Dissatisfied  
4 Very dissatisfied 
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